Firms may use nonlinear price schedules, possibly to the detriment of some consumers, to price discriminate and increase profits. However, it is possible that these nonlinear price schedules may also increase welfare from the consumer's perspective if they are able to serve portions of a market that firms may otherwise ignore. The more extensive theoretical literature on price discrimination shows how firms may use nonlinear price schedules to price discriminate by distorting product characteristics from their efficient levels given heterogeneous preferences among consumers. Additionally, the theoretical literature finds that whether or not this practice is welfare decreasing or increasing from the consumer's perspective depends on a number of factors, thus implying that the welfare implications of price discrimination from the consumer's perspective is an empirical question. Subsequently, some recent empirical papers have found this form of second-degree price discrimination to be welfare decreasing from the consumer's perspective whereas other papers, depending on the analyzed market, have found it to be welfare increasing.
Introduction
Nonlinear pricing schedules are a pricing strategy in which firms vary the marginal price per unit of their goods over several sizing options. Generally, firms use nonlinear pricing to provide quantity discounts to high demand consumers, but it is also possible that firms may utilize pricing menus that provide a quantity premia.
1 Dolan (1987) states that firms use nonlinear pricing to either price discriminate, incentivize consumers to purchase the options which have a lower marginal cost, to remain competitive, or some combination of the previous three. By varying marginal price per unit over size, firms are able to charge consumers with lower preferences for the good in question higher marginal prices per unit than those who prefer the good more and extract additional surplus from the market. Firms may also use nonlinear pricing schedules to incentivize consumers to choose the larger option which is cheaper for the firm to produce per unit. Additionally, if a firm's competitors are offering cheaper prices per unit for larger sizing options, then they may have to follow suit or lose business. This paper will focus only on firms using nonlinear pricing as a way to price discrimination.
With price discrimination as the reason for nonlinear pricing in mind, we may see firms manipulate either the price 2 or the size of their products as to increase the marginal price/marginal quantity per unit ratio of a small version above the efficient ratio. Doing so would allow firms to extract additional surplus from the lower demand consumers who purchase the smaller sizes. The theoretical literature on price discrimination suggests that this is not possible for the largest sizes of a product offered, as high demand-type consumers have relatively more elastic demand functions than low demand-type consumers.
3 This finding from the theoretical literature suggests that the largest sizes of a product must be priced and sized at the efficient marginal price/marginal quantity per unit ratio. However, since low demand-type consumers have a relatively more inelastic demand function than the high demand-type consumers, there is a concern that the smallest sizes, which are constructed by the firm to capture the low demand-type consumer market, could be inefficient in terms of their marginal price/marginal cost per unit ratios. Since the practice of second-degree price discrimination may be to the detriment of consumers from a welfare perspective, this concern leads me to analyze the welfare implications of these nonlinear pricing schedules. Which is a question that the previous empirical literature has found differing answers for.
The main empirical issue for estimating whether or not the theory holds in the case of nonlinear pricing schedules in the past has been due to data availability. Many other papers have estimated demand models using only product characteristics, prices and aggregate sales data. One of the strengths of this paper is that with the Nielsen Consumer Panel, I am able to observe household shopping decisions, as well as the demographic characteristics of the households, for every shopping trip they make for every year they participate in the panel. The Nielsen data allow me to use not only product characteristics to estimate the preferences of the households, but characteristics of these households to obtain a better fit to my discrete choice model by allowing for additional heterogeneity in tastes.
The market in question for this paper is fluid milk.
4 I choose to focus on fluid milk market because it has several convenient properties for the estimation of consumer preferences on the consumer side of the model, as well as marginal costs on the firm side. First, the USDA regulates and publishes raw fluid grade milk prices in the United States which provides a reasonable starting point for estimating the marginal cost per ounce of fluid milk. Estimating costs has been difficult for several other empirical studies and these regulations allow me to relax some of the assumptions that other papers have needed when modeling the firm's side of the model. Additionally, fluid milk sizing options in their current state are exogenous in that they follow the Imperial measurement system in the United States. This market norm allows me to focus this paper only on pricing and not have to worry about firms changing their menus through size. This is a potential weakness of the previous literature which chooses products for analysis where no such market norms exist. The main reason why the endogeneity of size may be a concern is that firms likely have the ability to choose both prices and quantities in the majority of other markets, a fact which has been mostly ignored by the majority of the previous literature and may lead to biased parameter estimates. Due the exogeneity of sizes in the fluid milk market, this potential source of bias is no longer a concern. Another strength of fluid milk for this type of analysis is that the outside good in question, or substitute good, can be well defined. I will assume that the outside good for fluid milk is any other consumable liquid product.
5
There are a couple necessary conditions required for firms to price discriminate. These necessary conditions include: firms must face a downward sloping demand curve, firms must be able to prevent resale of their product, and consumers must have heterogeneous tastes for the product. One may question that these necessary conditions are met in this market, since fluid milk appears to be a fairly homogeneous good. However, several simple observations of this market make it clear that these conditions are met.
There are many different types of fluid milk that are offered by many different firms. Some examples of the ways that firms vary their fluid milk's product characteristics are through a variety of sizes 6 , butterfat contents 7 , flavors 8 and whether or not the product has the USDA organic seal. I even observe some producers of fluid milk produce several different brands targeted at different segments of the market. Since all of these different product characteristics in all types of combinations exist for fluid milk on stores shelves, consumers must have heterogeneous tastes for fluid milk, otherwise there would be no reason to have this much variety within the market.
Additionally, it seems reasonable to assume that resale is not an issue in this market for a couple of reasons. Fluid milk is a relatively small portion of the average consumer's budget in that generally one to two gallons per week are plenty for households with even strongest of preferences for milk and the average price of a gallon of fluid milk is a couple of dollars. Also, if resale were a concern in this market, we would observe consumers purchasing the largest size of one type of fluid milk at the efficient marginal price/marginal quantity per ounce bundle and then pour the portion that they do not plan to consume out into another container and attempt to resell it on some secondary market. I am not aware of such a market. Another reason this is a reasonable assumption is that resale would require a large amount of coordination between households, which would seem to have a much higher marginal cost in terms of effort than the marginal gain from saving a couple of pennies.
One may think that firms within the fluid milk market may not face a downward sloping demand curve and have no market power thus would be unable to price discriminate due to fluid milk being a fairly homogeneous good. For this, I provide a couple of observations as anecdotal evidence of price discrimination within the market. On one shopping trip at a Kroger store in October 2016, I observed that the price for private label 9 gallon containers of 2% fluid milk was listed at $1.88 whereas the price of private label 2% quart containers was listed at $1.89. The packaging of both containers were very similar. This observation is hard to explain through a story of channel efficiency alone, as it is not likely that the absolute cost of producing a gallon container of fluid milk is cheaper than producing a quart of milk. With this pricing menu, the large grocery chain is actually paying consumers a penny to take away an additional three quarts of fluid milk.
One of the largest sources of market power that firms likely have in this market are search costs. Since fluid milk is such a small portion of the budget constraint, household on their weekly shopping trip are highly unlikely to make a trip to a different store to purchase fluid milk, even if they know that they can purchase the product for $0.50 less per gallon at a different location. Firms must have a decent idea as to what these search costs are for consumers and set their prices accordingly.
Even more evidence of firms within this market having market power was the difference in price between the non-organic regional brand of milk and the private label brand. A gallon of regional brand 2% fluid milk at this grocery store was listed at $4.99 a gallon, more than twice the price of the private label of $1.88. Unless this regional brand producer uses a wildly different production process, this more than two and a half times price differential is hard to explain through differential costs alone. There are two different explanations for this price differential. Regional firms could be exerting market power to charge a higher price for their "different, higher quality product." One concern with this explanation is that, all in all, the retailers have the final say in what price is seen by consumers, though many of these regional firms are known to provide incentives to retailers to set the price they prefer. An alternative explanation for this observation, based upon the fact that retailers have final say in prices, could be some profit maximizing behavior by retailers attempting to induce consumers to purchase their private label brand by having the shelf price of the regional brand good be significantly higher.
There are two main contributions of this paper. First, I show that firms use nonlinear pricing schedules to price discriminate among heterogeneous consumers with consumer choice micro data rather than aggregate sales and simulated consumer behavior. I do so by estimating a structural model of household preferences for fluid milk, I then use these parameter estimates, which allow for additional heterogeneity in tastes among households through the micro data, to compute the welfare implications of this form of price discrimination from the consumer's perspective. To estimate the welfare implications of price discrimination within this marketplace, I compare the total welfare in a hypothetical world where price discrimination via nonlinear pricing schedules is not allowed to the total welfare of the market place as it exists currently. This has been done in the past 10 but as stated previously, has yet to have been agreed upon within the empirical literature. Since this paper uses actual consumer choices during shopping trips, I find my result more compelling as the previous papers use only aggregate sales data and simulated consumer decisions.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will provide a layout of the composition of the market for fluid milk. Section 3 will present a literature review of both the existing theoretical and empirical literature on price discrimination as it relates to this paper. Section 4 will discuss the 9 Private label meaning store brand product. 10 See Leslie 2004 and others. datasets used for this paper. Section 5 will present a simple model for nonlinear pricing in the case of quantity discounts and discuss its implications. Section 6 will provide preliminary evidence of nonlinear pricing being used to price discriminate in this market. Section 7 will present the model that I will estimate for consumer demand as well as a strategy for estimating the marginal cost of milk. Section 8 will present the results of both the consumer and firm sides of the model, as well as where the consumer welfare counterfactual analysis is presented and section 9 will conclude.
Market Description: Fluid Milk in USA
With many steps of the production process, the market structure, and regulation of bulk milk prices, fluid milk retail pricing can be somewhat complex. This section of the paper will discuss all of these in three subsections. The first subsection will discuss the production process and market structure for fluid milk, whereas the second will discuss the regulations that are in place for the fluid milk market, and lastly the third will discuss the implications of the market structure and regulations.
Production Process and Market Structure
The first part of the production process starts at a farm where farmers raise cows that produce bulk milk. There are also seasonal supply fluctuations for production, as is true with almost all agricultural products. In the spring and early summer, cows produce more milk, whereas production of milk by a cows lowers in the fall and winter. Once the cows produce the bulk milk it is next sent to a processor that separates, produces and packages the various dairy products that come from the bulk milk. Once the production process is complete, the finished fluid milk product is sent to a retailer where, according to Manchester and Blayney (USDA 2001) [MB01], the retailer then sets the price of the final good and consumers make their consumption choices.
Dairy farmers may also have an incentive to form cooperatives to help gain market power when dealing with processors. These cooperatives control the supply of milk sent to processors and help eliminate some of the risk that a dairy farmer may face due to daily, season and other types of market fluctuations.
The production process for fluid milk has lead to an interesting market outcome in this industry. Many of the large grocery chains are fully integrated and have their own processing plants. Unfortunately, this is not the case for all large grocery chains within the industry. If it were, a possible way to identify which UPCs come from a vertically integrated production process would be via private label packaging vs regional brand. However, Nielsen masks the identity of each store's parent company by just assigning a common identifier among stores who are owned by the same parent company due to confidentiality reasons. As such, information on which large chains are vertically integrated is not useful, as it is not possible to line up the parent companies with the stores within the data.
Another difficulty with identifying which goods are produced via a vertically integrated production process is that some firms are vertically integrated in some parts of the country but not in others. For example, consider the following quote from Dean's, the largest regional brand fluid milk firm found in my data, website:
The Company (Dean's) is one of the nation's largest processors and direct-to-store distributors of fluid milk marketed under more than 50 local and regional dairy brands and private labels.
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This quote illustrates another issue with identifying which products come from a vertically integrated production process or not, as some of the "private label" brand goods, which are usually what is thought of when discussing a product that is produced within a vertically integrated firm are not necessarily from a vertically integrated production process.
Additionally, which processing plant that grocery stores are receiving their fluid milk from is not readily available due to confidentiality as well, though where potential processing plants that supply the stores are known.
All smaller convenience stores deal with independent milk processors. Many of these stores only carry one brand of fluid milk in only a few sizes. Due to this, as well as the generally higher prices, it is likely more appropriate to treat these convenience stores as a completely different market.
According to MB01, in the past many large grocery chains had several 11 regional brands on their shelves that were fully serviced by a representative from each brand respectively. In this regard, fully serviced means that each of the brands would have a representative bring the fluid milk to the store and have that representative stock, rotate and care for their brands space. In recent years, 12 there has been a shift from grocery chains to only have one or no regional brands in their floor plan. In addition to this, these regional brands no longer fully service these stores, instead they ship their product to the store and it is handled by the retailer. Once the product hits the loading dock of a retailer it becomes their property, although many of these regional brands will refund the retailer for damaged and outdated goods.
Regulations
Throughout this production process, there are many regulations set in place by the government. These pricing regulations are all placed on the processors and aim to benefit domestic dairy farmers. According to MB01, these regulations include: Federal milk price support, Federal milk marketing orders, import restrictions, export subsidies, domestic and international food aid programs, state level milk marketing programs and multi-state milk pricing organizations. Each of these regulatory practices has its own goal, some of which will be discussed below.
Federal milk price support was first put into place in 1949. These price supports provide a price floor for the price of bulk milk, though the price floor often does not bind. Federal milk marketing orders (1937) also provide a similar function in that they set pricing minimums for bulk milk, regulate the quality of fluid milk and limit the monopsony power of dairy processors.
The federal government also attempts to protect domestic dairy farmers through import restrictions and export subsidies. These two processes in conjunction give domestic dairy farmers the upper hand against foreign competition.
In addition to Federal pricing support, many states have their own policies which vary from state to state.
Overall, the goal of these regulations are to protect domestic dairy farmers both from international competition and dairy processors. These regulatory policies are stated to aim to help domestic dairy farmers by ensuring a minimum price in the market for bulk milk as well as ensure the quality of the fluid milk that comes from the processor. It also seems that the regulations that exist aim to lower risk for dairy farmers, though this is not explicitly stated by the USDA.
These data on bulk milk prices are available from the USDA's National Agricultural Statistics Service. The butterfat, bulk and skim milk prices are reported monthly at the state level.
11 They say two to six. 12 MB01 states the 1990s onward.
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Implications
According to MB01, even with the complex market structure and regulations in place in the fluid milk industry, ultimately the retailer is allowed to set any price they see fit in regards to the price that consumers face.
13 Even though each may set whichever price they see fit in terms of the prices that consumers face, many of the regional brands provides have a strong incentive to nudge retailers to set prices that the regional brands would prefer.
14 There is no federal regulation that requires a retailer to set a certain price for each good, 15 thus retail prices are determined by some combination of consumer demand, competition between retailers, and wholesale price.
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Literature Review
In this section, I summarize the current literature that exists on nonlinear pricing and price discrimination, starting with the theoretical literature then the empirical literature. The theoretical literature on price discrimination is quite extensive, as is the case with the majority of topics within the industrial organization field, whereas the current empirical literature is not nearly as extensive, mainly due to data limitations.
The story for price discrimination starts with Dupuit (1849). Dupuit laid out the necessary conditions for price discrimination by a profit maximizing monopolist as well as provided an example. In his paper, Dupuit discusses the several classes of tickets offered by trains. These different classes were used to charge higher demand consumers higher prices as well as used to induce the marginal consumer to purchase a higher class ticket then they might otherwise purchase. Pigou (1920) and Robinson (1933) both more formally define the degrees to which a monopolist can price discriminate as well as named them.
The first couple of modern papers to discuss second-degree price discrimination were Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Maskin and Riley (1984) . These papers consider a monopolist's design of a price and sizing menu when consumers' preferences towards the product are unknown to the firm, but have some distribution that is known to the firm. The equilibrium that is found by both papers is that the highest demand consumer is offered a product that is efficiently sized and all other consumers self select into a smaller option that is tailored to their preferences though inefficiently sized.
Many papers have used this result and attempted to explain why firms may use nonlinear pricing in such a way. Dolan (1987) provides three possible stories as to why firms may use nonlinear pricing as a mechanism for price discrimination: heterogeneous consumers, channel efficiency and competitive bidding.
A quote from Buchanen (1953) sums up the heterogeneous consumers reason best"the demand schedule of small buyers is more inelastic over the relevant price range than that of large buyers". This variation in consumer type allows firms to exploit small demand consumers while having to somewhat cater to those with high demand in lower pricing per unit.
13 Though the range of prices that stores may set depends on which state they are located in. It is my understanding that in states such as California, grocery stores are allowed very little freedom to set their own prices due to the state level price regulations implemented by the California legislature, but in other states, no such pricing regulations exist at the state level at all. I am currently working on finding this information out for the states in my sample, but this information has been difficult to find.
14 One such way of doing so, which I have heard is the case in the soda industry, is to provide large cost reductions to stores if they set the price at $X during a specific period of time.
15 Though there may be state level regulations that impact this decision. 16 Which is a function of the Federal regulation on butterfat, skim and bulk milk prices.
The channel efficiency argument for price discrimination is that firms may have cost savings if consumers buy specific quantities of their goods. In an anecdotal example of this Dolan shows why Sealed Air Corporation (SAC) provides lower marginal prices to those who purchase larger quantities. If SAC's product is sold in quantities that are smaller than a truckload, they must send one truck to multiple locations to serve many consumers, but if one consumer purchases an entire truckload of their product, then they only have to send the truck to one location. Having a truck serve a single location only results in considerable shipping cost savings for the firm. To induce consumers to purchase entire truckloads of their products, SAC lowers marginal price as the quantity that consumers purchase increases.
The last reason for price discrimination discussed by Dolan is competition over market share. Dolan states that if only a portion of firms within a market place utilize nonlinear price schedules to provide quantity discounts, then the firms who do not may not be able to compete with their competitors for consumers whose demand is relatively more elastic. The example he uses is electronic components suppliers. When interviewed as to why they offer lower marginal prices to large buyers of their products, they stated that it was because the other firms do it too.
Another paper that looks at the welfare implications of price discrimination is Sharkey and Sibley (1993) [SS93] . In this paper, SS93 model two types of consumers and test the standard finding within the literature that marginal price per unit is equal to marginal cost per unit for the highest demand users. In their model, SS93 find that the distribution of consumer types determines if marginal price per unit is equal to marginal cost per unit for the highest demand users of the goods. Depending on how types are distributed, equilibriums of marginal price per unit higher than marginal cost per unit and marginal cost per unit higher than marginal price per unit can be supported. SS93 also test to see if price discrimination can exist under competition. With their model, they find that price discrimination can exist under duopoly, but only if there is a regulator that favors high demand users of the good over low demand users.
The final theoretical paper that I will discuss that takes the welfare implications of price discrimination into account is Reiss and White (2006) [RW06] . In their paper they provide a method for welfare analysis that estimates consumer surplus in the face of menu pricing. They too find that the distribution of demand determines the welfare implications of nonlinear pricing.
Due to recent advances in empirical techniques as well as increases in data availability, the empirical literature on price discrimination has been growing in recent years. Some of the earlier work uses reduced form estimation techniques, as opposed to the newer empirical papers on nonlinear pricing which use structural models to estimate demand for the goods in question. One downfall of the current literature is that almost all of these papers use aggregate sales data rather than actual consumer choice. The first of these types of papers I present Friebel et. al (2015) [FOG15]. FOG15's finds evidence for price discrimination in the market for wheat in Russia, a fairly homogeneous good similar to fluid milk. Their paper deviates from mine in that they focus on price discrimination in the export market rather than in the consumer goods market. This allows them to use a reduced form approach that is inappropriate for the questions that this paper attempts to answer. FOG15 finds evidence for price discrimination by Russian firms in 25 out of 61 destination countries within their data set over the 2002-2011 period.
The more closely related literature to my paper are papers that use structural models of demand. These papers include: Leslie (2004) , Cohen (2008) , Liu and Shen (2012) [LS12], Miller and Osborne (2014) [MO14], and McManus (2007) . Leslie (2004) uses data from the Broadway show Seven Guitars to estimate the welfare and profit implications of price discrimination. In this paper, Leslie uses a structural model that allows him to use counterfactual analysis that allows Leslie to estimate the welfare implications for price 8 discrimination. Leslie finds that the price discrimination observed by the firm increases profits by 5% but has little to no effect on consumer welfare, thus price discrimination in this case seems to increase total surplus. Cohen (2008) estimates how packaging size is used in the paper towel market as a vehicle for price discrimination. In this paper, Cohen uses a discrete choice model with product characteristics and aggregate sales data to estimate model parameters for demand. This allows Cohen allows to perform counterfactual analyses similar to Leslie 2004. Cohen finds quantity discounts that are consistent with second degree price discrimination rather than what could be attributed to cost differences across the sizes of the goods. Cohen also finds that consumers are better off with price discrimination as there is more competition amongst firms in the multi-roll package size segment of the market due to the pricing strategy.
In a working paper, Liu and Shen (2012) [LS12] estimate the degree to which firms in the carbonated soda market are able to price discriminate based upon firm type; i.e. private label brand or national brand products. LS12 estimates a discrete choice model using a subset of the data that this paper uses, the Nielsen Scanner dataset, but do not use the Nielsen Panel data and thus, must simulate individual consumer preferences. LS12 also uses the assumption that firms in this market compete in a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium setting that allows them to estimate the marginal cost of the sodas in their model, though this assumption is hard to believe as these firms clearly do not compete in such a way. This assumption allows LS12 to identify to what extent both private labels and national labels are able to price discriminate. Their main findings are that private labels are able to price discriminate just like national brands within this market, which they claim at least somewhat explains the growth of market shares of private label sodas. Miller and Osborne 2014 [MO14] use data of the Portland cement industry in California, Nevada and Arizona to estimate a structural model of spatial differentiation and price discrimination. MO14 finds that if price discrimination were not allowed, consumer surplus in the cement industry would increase by approximately $30 million dollars per year, thus implying that price discrimination is welfare decreasing from the consumer's perspective, 17 a result not commonly found within the previous literature.
McManus (2007) uses a structural discrete choice model to estimate whether or not specialty coffee shops are able to price discriminate using sizing for their good. McManus also looks at how nonlinear pricing may not only lead to different marginal prices per ounce along sizing options, but also how it may distort product characteristics away from their efficient levels. He finds that nonlinear pricing allows firms to make size of the smallest cups of specialty coffee "inefficiently small" for the price that is set, which McManus concludes that firms do so in part to incentivize consumers to either buy the next size up or have to pay additional rents to the firm. He also finds that these distortions do not exist for the highest demand consumers, a finding that is consistent with the theoretical literature.
The model that will be estimated in this paper is based on Cohen 2008 model, but deviates in two regards. First, I observe consumer demographics for each purchase, thus I do not have to use Cohen's noisy measure of the population demographics within physical market to deal with potential sources of consumer heterogeneity. As such, my second deviation from Cohen 2008 is that I do not utilize the random coefficients framework for estimating my model, which Cohen uses to address issues of substitution patterns that exist within multinomial logit modeling, the interdependence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). My reason for not addressing this within this paper is that by utilizing household characteristics, the IIA issue is less of a concern. For example, suppose a regional brand firm introduces a new skim milk product to the marketplace. Household types that that are more likely to consume products similar this type of product, such as households that are more likely to a different regional brand skim milk, are far more likely to switch than households who are more likely to consume a far different product, such as private label whole milk. Since I have household characteristics, I identify which type of household prefers each product type, making the IIA issue far less of a concern.
In summary, the theoretical literature on price discrimination defines price discrimination and has attempted to rationalize this pricing strategy commonly used by firms, whereas the newer empirical literature on price discrimination uses structural models to estimate demand for goods, then discusses the price discriminatory implications of their parameter estimates via counterfactual analyses. The main theme from the theoretical literature is that since the demand for the good is relatively inelastic for low demand users as compared to high demand users, firms are able to set higher marginal prices per unit for low demand users and it largely agrees that the highest demand user will always have an option where marginal price is equal to marginal cost.
The empirical literature largely answers two main questions: are nonlinear pricing schedules used as a way for firms to price discriminate and if so, what are the welfare implications within the market place. The main deviation within the empirical literature are how the supply side/marginal costs are dealt with. Some papers (Liu and Shen (2012) and Cohen (2008)) model and estimate marginal costs of a representative firm, whereas other papers either do not have to worry about marginal costs (the Miravete papers, Ayral (2014) and Leslie (2004) ) as the marginal costs are sufficiently small in their industry, or they have discussions with firms to find what the costs of the products are (McManus (2007)). Estimates for marginal cost are important in this literature as many of the findings could also be explained as costs savings by the firm without them.
Data
Data for this paper come from the Nielsen Panel and Scanner Datasets for the years 2008 and 2009. 18 In the subsections below, I discuss the characteristics of these datasets, as well as any other supplementary datasets that have been used.
The Nielsen Panel Dataset
The Nielsen Panel dataset includes 40,000 households from 2004-2006 and was expanded to 60,000 households starting in 2007 and thereafter. These data include each and every item purchased by a household within the panel year at the household-shopping trip level. Since the observation level of these data is the household-shopping trip, the Nielsen Panel dataset includes household demographics for each participating household that participates, as well as the Universal Product Codes (UPC) of all items purchased by the household purchases during the particular shopping trip to the store in question. Due to potential differences in preferences that may vary within regions,
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18 The Nielsen Panel itself goes from 2004-2016, but due to a variety of reasons including: potential changes in preferences that may occur over the long-run, macroeconomic factors, and most importantly, the quality of these data are much better over this two year period than any other two year period in the panel. After removing inactive panelists and trimming down to an individual region, 13,352 households with 22,154 household years are left in my sample. As such, I omit all other years from the analysis.
19 And also in part due to the size of these data.
I use households from the sample that live in FIPS Division 3: Midwest East North Central. 20 This FIPS division has some convenient qualities that will be discussed later on as well.
The strength of using the Nielsen Panel data as opposed to datasets used in previous studies is the observation of actual purchasing choices by households rather than aggregate sales by firms. With these data I am able to use real household characteristics 21 coupled with actual choices rather than simulate consumer heterogeneity as done previously by Liu and Shen (2012), Cohen (2008) , Leslie (2004) and McManus (2007) . One potential drawback of this panel is the high attrition rate of the panelists. This may be due to the somewhat weak incentives for participation that will be discussed later. The Nielsen states that it generally retains 80% of their panel from year to year 22 . This is not particularly important to this paper as I am more interested in firm behavior, so I will be treating this panel as a repeated cross section from year to year, though I use the panel aspect of the data to construct a psuedo-purchasing history variable, the time (days) since the household last purchased fluid milk, to include how the stock of fluid milk the household currently has may affect future or current purchasing decisions.
Nielsen uses a stratified, proportional sampling technique to create a representative sample of the continental United States. Households are randomly selected and invited to join the panel either through a mail or email invitation. Nielsen does not directly pay the households selected to participate in the panel, but it does provide some other incentives. These incentives include: monthly prize drawings, gift points awarded for weekly transmission of data and a sweepstakes. Nielsen states that they also try to encourage participation and create enthusiasm through ongoing communication. They use the following methods to do so: a monthly newsletter, telecommunications, Q & A section with helpful tips and reminders, personalized computer tips and reminders after transmitting, notice of monthly sweepstakes winner, personalized letters for reporting problems and questions, letters from the president, gift point statement, help desk, an 800 number for panelists to call and exit interviews.
In addition to providing rich household characteristics, this dataset also has a variety of product, brand, and retailer demographics as well as the overall purchases by households.
23 Sales of UPCs sold that are in sizes that do not utilize the Imperial measurement system are discarded from this sample for estimation purposes, but kept for the construction of other variables.
24 With that being said, the discarded portion of the data are less than 1% of the overall sample. Additionally, the removal of these sizes allows me to clearly define the top of the menu, as previously it was somewhat muddled. Summary statistics for this data cleaning procedure are included in appendix E. 20 The states included in this region are: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio and Wisconsin. 21 Which include: household income, household size, type of residence, household composition, age and presence of children, male and female head employment status, male and female head education, male and female head occupation, marital status of the head of household, race, location of the panelist, a dummy variable for WIC program participation, and the age of the male and female heads of household. See appendix D for tables with summary statistics for the panelists.
22 In my subsample of these data, I find that 2,306 households only participate in the year 2008, 2,244 household only participate in 2009 and 8,802 households participate in both years.
23 Observable with this dataset are: the date of each purchase, a store code and location which provide information on the type of retailer, the amount spent by the consumer on each shopping trip, a product UPC for each item purchased, a retailer code which provides information on the type of retailer (grocery store, mini mart, etc.), the price paid for each item, the packaging size for each item, an organic claim dummy variable for each product, various product demographics, and the brand of each product.
24 UPCs with containers of the following sizes remain: gallon, half gallon, and quarts.
The Nielsen Scanner Dataset
Ideally, I would observe not only what households choose to purchase during a shopping trip, but all of the choices the household did not choose as well. The Nielsen Panel dataset only provides information on the choices that households make on a particular trip, rather than the full menu of options that household faced. Since this is the case, I utilize the Nielsen Scanner dataset to simulate the remaining portion of the choice set the households did not choose. The Nielsen Scanner dataset contains the weekly sales of each UPC sold at a store as well as product characteristics similar to what are provided within the Panel Dataset. More information on how the choice sets were constructed can be found in appendix D.
Costs of Raw Fluid Grade Milk
The USDA regulates the price that farmers sell butterfat, bulk and skim milk to dairy processors. The prices of these goods are all regulated by the USDA are published in the National Agricultural Statistics Service's (NASS) monthly report. I use these sales prices as a way to control for the input cost of fluid milk.
A Simple Model of Nonlinear Pricing: The Case of Quantity Discounts
The predictions from a simple theoretical model can lend us useful insights in this case of utilizing nonlinear pricing as a method of second-degree price discrimination. Consider a representative monopolist offering nonlinearly priced menu options of some good Q to consumers with heterogeneous preferences. In this model, I assume that the nonlinear pricing schedule the representative monopolist constructs offers a quantity discount for their good.
Model The representative firm offers three price quantity bundles for a good: (p l , q l ), (p m , q m ) and (p h , q h ). Consumers in this market may purchase only one price-quantity bundle and there is only one period in the model. I assume that consumers preferences for the good are heterogeneous and that an optimal solution of menu with three choices exists. I also assume that p l < p m < p h and q l < q m < q h , which is required for the menu that is offered to provide a quantity discount. Additionally, assume that the representative firm is unwilling to sell any quantity above q h to any consumer, such that the price of all quantities higher than q h is set at +∞. In the case of a quantity discount, at least one of the following inequalities must be true:
A graphical depiction of both the menu of options and the budget constraint that consumers face in case of (1c) are provided as figure 1 and figure 2 in appendix A. For simplicity, I linearize the budget constraint that consumers face though it is important to note that consumers do not have the option to choose any quantity other than q l , q m or q h to purchase in this model. This situation yields the following equation for the linearized budget constraint:
where I is one's income, q is the quantity of the good that is consumed and Y is the numeraire good. The price of the numeraire good, Y , is normalized to 1. The way that figure 2 is drawn, if a consumer chooses to consume q h they spend their entire income which is implicitly assuming that I = p h q h . If I > p h q h , then the entire graph shifts upwards by I − p h q h which would be the minimum amount of Y that is consumed regardless of their choice of Q.
There are some general conclusions that can be made from this graph. Due to the quantity discounts in this pricing menu, consumers in this market face a nonconvex budget constraint. This causes the kinks that are located at q l and q m . Utility maximizing consumers are unable to locate at q l or q m unless the numeraire good, Y , and Q are perfect complements. In the case of goods that are not perfect complements, only consumers who consume q 0 and q h are utility maximizing. This is due to the nonconvexity in the budget constraint.
Consumers with a strong preference for good Q will have indifference curves similar to IC b and locate closer to or at q h . Those with weaker preferences for good Q will have indifferences curves similar to IC a and locate near or at q 0 .
Consumers may have indifference curves like IC a where their tangency to the budget constraint is located between two points. If this is the case, in data I will observe them locating on the discrete point nearest to their tangency to the budget constraint. For this particular consumer, I would likely observe them consuming none of the good Q in data.
Consumers may also have indifference curves that look like IC b . This consumer would be indifferent between consuming at a point between q l and q m or q m and q h . Since it is not possible for consumers to consume at either point, I may observe one of two things in data. They may just consume at the point their indifference curve is centered around, in this case q m , and locate at on an indifference curve that is below their utility maximizing level, IC b . If I introduce dynamics to the model, as seen in the data, they may also consume some combination of the other two quantities over time in an attempt to put them on their utility maximizing indifference curve IC b . For the case of consumer b, I would observe them choosing q h some portion of the time and q l the rest of the time. Which option consumers with indifference curves like IC b choose depends on where their tangencies are located on the budget constraint. If they are closer to the point they are centered upon, they will likely just choose to consume at that point and be pooled with those whose preferences locate them close to that quantity. If the tangencies are closer to the other points that surround the indifference curve that they are centered upon, then they may exhibit the dynamic behavior described above.
There is one general welfare implications to be discussed with this simple model. Since utility maximizing consumers are unable to locate at points q l or q m , consumers who do not locate at one of the corners are worse off due to the nonconvexity of the budget constraint under the assumption that Y and Q are not perfect complements. If the firm were to offer a continuum of options rather than the discrete points, these consumers would be able to locate at their utility maximizing level and would be better off.
25 Thus, the discrete menu of options, along with the quantity discount, create a nonconvex budget constraint reduces consumer surplus for consumers who do not locate at
Preliminary Evidence of Price Discrimination
This section provides simple reduced form evidence that is consistent with the idea that firms within the fluid milk market are using nonlinear pricing as a way to price discriminate. First, I provide several graphs and tables that are consistent with price discrimination, then I will provide regression results from a simple hedonic pricing model. The reduced form regression results that are presented in this section are also consistent with price discrimination. Table 1 and table 2 present unit-price statistics and figure 3 provides graphs of the mean price, price-cost differential, and price-cost ratio for units sold by the firms in these data. The graphs break down the price statistics into several categories, purchases made with and without coupons 26 and purchases of regional brand vs private label products. Since I assume that fluid milk is only sold in containers that are sized using the Imperial measurement system, all observations fall into one of three categories: gallon, half gallon or quart.
Since the average price-cost differential and price-cost ratio generally decrease as the size of a product increases, figure 3 is consistent with firms using nonlinear pricing to price discriminate. Additionally, for gallon containers, which are assumed to be the largest sized offered by firms, the price-cost differential is very close to zero, suggesting that these products are close to the efficient price-quantity bundle, an observation that is consistent with the current literature. It is interesting to note that in the graphs on the right, it appears that firms are not using nonlinear pricing to price discriminate between cup and pint sized units. These means are very close however and as a whole, there is a downward trend. Additionally, these are just means and do not control for differences other than size.
Another interesting portion of the data is the pricing behavior of private label goods. It is interesting to note that not only are these graphs consistent with a story of firms using nonlinear sizes to price discriminate, but that it holds for the smallest sized containers as well. This suggests that firms are not only able to use nonlinear pricing to price discriminate with their private label brand products, but they are able to do so to a greater degree than regional brands. This observation agrees with the main finding of Liu and Shen (2012) in their study of the soda industry.
After observing these simple trends in price statistics along sizes, I estimate the following price hedonic model:
where P P O ist is the average price per ounce of UPC i, of size s at time t. Size is are a vector of size dummies for product i of size s.
27 CP O it is the price of raw fluid grade milk per ounce of UPC i at time t. X ist are a vector of various product characteristics, year and market controls that are included in the table.
Additionally, price may vary from brand to brand, thus I also estimate the following model with brand fixed effects:
where δ i is a brand fixed effect for UPC i. The results of these regressions are presented in table 3. The first two columns of table 3 are the simple price hedonic models 28 , and third and fourth column 26 Nielsen does not provide a clean definition as to what a "coupon" is beyond a piece of paper that is given at the register to provides a discount.
27 In these data, size for each UPC does not vary over time. 28 The first column without any controls and the second column with controls included.
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of table 3 are price hedonic models with brand fixed effects. 29 . All of the coefficient estimates for size in ounces negative and statistically significant at the 1% level of significance, except in the case of models with controls for 1.5% fluid milk 30 . Since all of these regressions include the published raw fluid grade milk prices, these findings are consistent with firms using nonlinear pricing schedules to price discriminate in this market. This finding is not only robust to model specification 31 , but also to the different butterfat contents of fluid milk.
These findings do not come without a warning however. First, all of these models implicitly assume that container size is continuous and that the product set is dense in ounces. As such, the interpretation of these coefficient estimates are equivalent to estimating consumers average marginal willingness to pay for an additional ounce of fluid milk. Since these data are measured using the Imperial measurement system, the variation in size that these models are using to identify these coefficients is in large discrete changes in size, rather than small changes in size. Since this is the case, it is clear that these coefficient estimates are not properly identified.
Following an argument originally presented by McManus (2007) , this econometric strategy would be appropriate if firms offered a menu of sizing options that were continuous in size, or it were possible to purchase any amount in ounces at the very least. This is the major downfall of reduced-form econometric identification strategies in this scenario, as the model is attempting to identify an effect that is implicitly continuous, with variation that is in large unit changes. Another downfall of this identification strategy is for sales of the largest container size, as I do not observe a size that the household is unwilling to pay. Since I will never see a price they are unwilling to pay for an additional ounce of fluid milk it is impossible to identify their marginal willingness to pay for an additional ounce of milk.
With these two main points in mind, these results should be taken as a signal that firms may be using nonlinear pricing schedules to price discrimination in this market, and a more appropriate approach should be taken to show that this is the case. The structural approach proposed in the next section of this paper does not suffer from these weaknesses, and the marginal willingness to pay for an additional ounce of fluid milk is properly identified even with these large discrete changes in size.
According to Berry (1984) , there are several other strengths to estimating structural models instead of reduced form models for demand estimation in addition to previous concerns. He states that it is possible to estimate a reduced form model for demand, but due to the endogeneity of price that will be discussed later, one must find a set of valid instruments to estimate the price elasticities of each good. The problem with just finding instruments and using reduced form techniques in this case is that in a market with N goods there are N 2 elasticities to estimate. Parameterizing the consumer utility function allows one to estimate the N 2 cross-price elasticities from far fewer parameters.
Another strength to structural estimation that Berry points out in his paper is the ability to perform counterfactuals. This strength of structural estimation is particularly crucial to this paper, as I intend to estimate the welfare effects of price discrimination within this market as well as check to see if firms could be better off without following the Imperial measurement system for their menu of options.
The last strength of structural estimation that Berry discusses is the model's ability to allow one to move easily between statements about aggregate demand and statements about consumer 29 The third column without any controls and the fourth column with controls included. 30 May be due to sample size since only 2,487 observations of 1.5% fluid milk in my sample of approximately 2.365 billion observations. 31 Controls or no controls, and OLS versus brand fixed effects utility. This will be very important for this paper in the welfare analysis section. With both Berry and McManus' comments in mind, it seems appropriate to estimate a structural model for demand rather than a reduced form model in this context, as I will be able to cleanly identify the marginal willingness to pay for an additional ounce of fluid milk for each consumer type. Additionally, I will also have the ability to perform the interesting counterfactuals that are not possible in a reduced form model.
Structural Model
In the first subsection of this section of the paper, I estimate the demand for fluid milk using a discrete choice model. In the subsection that follows the demand portion of the model, I introduce a model for estimating firm's marginal costs within the fluid milk market. Both the consumer and firm sides of the model follow closely to Cohen (2008) . It is important to estimate the demand side of the market separately from the supply side of the market due to the endogeneity of prices.
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Following a reduced form approach in estimating this type of model will cause estimates to be biased due to simultaneity of the demand and supply portions of the market.
Demand for Fluid Milk
I assume that each household, i, chooses to purchase one or zero units of a fluid milk UPC during each shopping trip.
33 For simplicity, my model does not consider the household's decision of whether or not to go on a shopping trip, as well as which store to patron during a trip if they choose to go on one.
34 The decision to purchase zero units of a fluid milk UPC is described as choosing the outside good.
35 Purchasing options are indexed by j ∈ J. I assume that all stores that households choose to patron for a shopping trip offer all possible choices within the choice set J.
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Each fluid milk UPC is grouped into a choice, j, within the choice set, J to reduce the vast number of UPCs of fluid milk that the household could potentially choose from. Each choice, j, is characterized by: (1) BFC j , which is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the UPC has a butterfat content of 2% or greater; (2) size j , which is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the UPC is sold in a gallon sized container and zero if the UPC is sold in a half gallon or quart sized container; 37 (3) PL j , which is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the UPC is a private 32 In the model that is presented in this section, I will assume that there are some characteristics of each product that are observed by both firms and consumers but unobserved to the econometrician. It is fair to assume that a profit maximizing firm will take these characteristics into account when determining what price to set when constructing each price-quantity bundle. Thus by construction, price is correlated with part of the error term of the model and is endogenous.
33 I define a shopping trip to be going to a store that offers a menu of products that includes fluid milk 34 This is important to point out as Thomassen (2017) states that a source of potential bias in cost-side parameter estimates exists from ignoring the cross-category pricing effects of other goods the firm sells. A portion of the motivation for this type of bias is that households consider the whole basket of goods they intend to purchase when choosing which store to patron. By removing the household's choice of when and where to go on a shopping trip, and considering how small of the portion of the average household's budget is in terms of fluid milk expenditures, this potential source of bias is far less of a concern for my model.
35 Which as previously defined, includes all consumable liquids other than fluid milk from a cow. 36 As described in Section 4.2, the Nielsen Panel dataset does not allow me to observe the entire menu of goods available for households to choose from, but only those actually chosen by the household. As is the case, I use the Nielsen Scanner dataset to simulate the menu of products the store had available on the date of the shopping trip as outlined in that section.
37 Note: I discard all shopping trips where households purchase fluid milk of sizes that are not gallon, half gallon label branded 38 product; (4) org j , which is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the UPC is an organic product and zero otherwise; (5) ξ j , product characteristics of the UPC that are observed by economic agents but unobserved to the econometrician; 39 (6) the unit-price, p j . First, I consider the model for demand assuming without controlling for household demographic characteristics, which I will refer to as the standard model for the remainder of this paper. I do so because the vast majority of the existing empirical literature on price discrimination has been done with aggregate market level data which implicitly some sort simulation for household decisions. The existing literature does so because household level decision data were not available to authors of those papers. Since I have the household level decisions and demographic characteristics available via the Nielsen Consumer Panel and Scanner dataset, my preferred specification will include household demographic information. However, by specifying and estimating a structural model of the demand for fluid milk without including household demographics, and comparing those estimates to my preferred specification which includes household demographic characteristics, I am able to observe the potential bias of the parameter estimates that is caused by the aggregation in using market level data in a somewhat back-of-the-envelope manner.
That being said, I assume that the indirect utility associated with purchasing product j to be linear in product characteristics in both models. The specification of the model without household demographics is presented in the equation below:
Where jt represents the standard model's deviations from the mean preference for good j, which I assume to be distributed iid with a type I extreme value distribution (TIEV). Under this assumption for the distribution of the error term, the standard model's level indirect utility becomes a multinomial logit model (MNL) where the market shares for each good j ∈ J are defined as:
where δ j = βBFC j + τ size j + ζorg j + αp j + ξ j is the population mean utility for product j. I then solve for these parameters via maximum likelihood. To introduce household demographic characteristics into the model, I assume that household i receives indirect utility from purchasing product j as indicated below:
where the main difference between this specification and the standard specification is the π ij , which is defined below:
are quart sized, but I do include them when calculating the measure of how long it has been since they last purchased fluid milk. 38 Or "store" brand. 39 I utilize a fixed effects approach to control for the product characteristics that are unobservable to the econometrician but observed by economic agents. In particular, I include a private label dummy as well as the private label dummy interacted with various channel type indicator variables. Using a fixed effects approach with these particular fixed effects is valid if ξ j only varies at the private label vs. regional brand and channel type levels.
where H i is a vector of household characteristics.
40 Similar to the standard specification, I assume that ijt represents household i's deviation from the mean preference for good j, is distributed iid with a type I extreme value distribution (TIEV).
One deviation from the standard specification is that I no longer predict market shares, but instead the probability that each household i chooses good j during a shopping trip. Since I make similar assumptions on the household specific taste shock, this specification is also a MNL model and the probability that household i chooses product j is defined as:
where δ j = βBFC j + τ size j + ζorg j + αp j + ξ j is the population mean utility for product j andπ j represents the mean household characteristic's contribution to the utility of product j. I then solve for these parameters via maximum likelihood as well.
A well known issue of the MNL model is known as the "independence from irrelevant alternatives" (IIA) 41 IIA, caused by the iid TIEV assumption of the MNL error term, is the unintuitive substitutional patterns that predicts that households will respond to an increase in the unit-price of product j by substituting to the most popular products rather than substituting to products that have characteristics that are similar to product j. This is far less of a concern for my model's specification however, as theπ j term, which includes H i , constructs heterogeneous preferences specific to each household based upon their demographic characteristics. In turn, substitutional patterns within my MNL model are not only a function of the mean utility of the products within the choice set, but also a function of each household i's preferences, which are constructed and estimated by including the π ij term. As a result, I find that it is both unnecessary and inefficient to implement an approach that would essentially constructs heterogeneous preferences among households via simulation 42 or via an a priori grouping of choices within the choice set, 43 as I am able to estimate these heterogeneous preferences using the household demographic information instead. 
Firm Behavior
On the firm's side of the model, I assume that firms take the menu of products sold by the firm as given.
45 Additionally, I assume that firms participate in price competition. This allows me to infer marginal costs without firm-level cost data if: (1) unit marginal costs are constant for each product j, (2) unit marginal costs are non-constant, but a function of container size over the product set J. Together these two assumptions imply that the cost of producing the first half gallon container of private label whole milk is the same as the cost of producing the second half gallon container of private label whole milk for a particular firm F . However, the cost of producing one gallon container of private label whole milk is not restricted to be equivalent to the cost of producing two half gallon containers of private label whole milk for the same firm F .
From here, I define marginal costs for product j sold by firm f in state s during week t as a function of the vector X Cost :
where X Cost f sjt consists of the butterfat cost for each choice j that varies at the firm/state level, the skim cost for each choice j that varies at the firm/state level, the total number of firms within the three digit zip code and channel dummy variables interacted with a gallon sized dummy variable.
I can then use the demand system/parameter estimates that determine consumer choices to infer marginal costs. For simplicity, I'll refer the market shares by consumers as:
where θ are the utility parameters estimated in the demand system (excluding the disutility of price parameter α). p, X and H refer to the prices in the observed prices, observed product characteristics and household demographics respectively. Before continuing, two key points must be made: (1) due to a lack of data on the menu of products that each firm offers, I use the simulated menu described section 4.2 and assume each firm offers all choices within the set J at some time during my sample period. However, if store has not sold a unit of a particular choice within a month of the current week, I assign them a zero for in the "product ownership" matrix for that time period. Additionally, I aggregate to the store-week level. Assuming that unit marginal costs are constant over output, firms' profits are proportional to:
where h ∈ J|h = j. Then the first order condition for p j where j ∈ J is given by:
Which expressed in vector form is:
where ∆ jr = −Ω * jr ∂S j ∂pr .
∂S j ∂pr
46 is the (J − 1) − by − (J − 1) matrix of own-and cross-derivatives and Ω * jr is the firm ownership matrix which elements are equal to 1 if firm i sells products j and r and zero otherwise.
From here, I obtain marginal costs to be:
where ∆ −1 S is the markup term: M (α, θ; p, X, H; ξ) or, M (Θ).
46 Which following Choi et. al (2013) is computed as E jr * srj pr
The strategy I use for estimating the cost side of the model is to find the parameters that minimize the prediction errors (i.e. the distance between the vector of observed and predicted unit-prices) from the following:
After estimating these markups, I find that some of the time they are negative. 47 However, there is a strong correlation 48 between negative markups and whether or not the product is on sale that week. From this, I draw the conclusion that when firms advertise/put fluid milk on sale they treat the product as a loss leader, whereas during normal weeks they price discriminate.
Results
In this section, I review the results of the methods outlined in section 7. Demand and cost parameter estimates are provided in table 4 and table 7, respectively.
Demand Results
Note that the parameter estimates presented in table 4 cannot be directly interpreted as marginal effects, but finding the marginal effects are quite simple as doing so requires dividing these estimates by the absolute value of α, the price sensitivity parameter. These marginal effects are shown in table 5. The first set of columns in tables 4 and 5 present the results from the standard model whereas the next set of column are my preferred specification with includes household demographic characteristics. I will frequently compare the estimates obtained from each model throughout the remainder of my discussion of these estimates. Before comparing the results of the standard model to my preferred specification, it may be useful to discuss the interpretations of several of the estimated parameters and I'll begin with discuss the estimated marginal benefits of my preferred specification.
First, consider the estimated marginal effect associated with the gallon sized dummy variable, which is 1.33417 in my preferred specification. This parameter estimate implies that, on average, households are willing to pay approximate $1.33 more to purchase goods sold in gallon sized containers rather than the smaller sizes. The estimate of this marginal effect seems quite reasonable both in its sign as well as its magnitude, as the average difference in prices between gallon sized containers and is similar in magnitude for goods that share an organic status.
The marginal effect of 0.17433 associated with the butterfat content dummy variable seems reasonable in terms of magnitude and since it is positive, is consistent with the consumer theory which states that on average, consumers prefer more product characteristics to less. My parameter estimate associated with the organic product characteristic is somewhat odd, as ex ante one may think it should be positive, but I will save that discussion for the next subsection where I discuss the difference in parameter estimates between the standard model and my preferred specification in much greater detail.
The marginal effects with the "UFE" label are fixed effects that control for product characteristics that are observed by economic agents within the model, but unobserved to the econometrician.
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One of the major issues with demand estimation of markets is endogeneity caused by not controlling for the unobserved characteristics, with the major concern of endogeneity being shown via 47 Which varies based upon the product characteristics. 48 A sample correlation coefficient of .87. 49 Note: The "UFE: (Channel)" fixed effects are all interacted with a private label indicator variable.
biased estimates of the price sensitivity parameter, α. The reason for this concern is that often times these unobserved product characteristics are correlated with some notion of quality that the econometrician cannot properly control for via standard estimation procedures. If economic agents participating within the marketplace do in fact associate the unobserved product characteristics with quality, the it is likely that those characteristics will increase the prices of goods where they are present, as both household and firms can observe the unobservable and respond accordingly. As such, this source of endogeneity is said to on average bias the estimates of the price sensitivity parameter towards zero and could potentially cause the parameter estimate to return as positive, which is a large concern as a positive parameter estimate for α would imply that households prefer to spend more money on the goods within the market to less on average. I report nearly identical α estimates of approximately -1.96 in the models I estimate, which I find to be quite reasonable in terms of magnitude and surely correct in the sign of the coefficient estimate.
However, utilizing this method to control for potential product unobservables, rather than an IV style approach, does have come with the caveat that my models implicitly assume, and is only valid, if household and firms perceptions of the unobservable product characteristics differ only between store channels and brand type.
50 Thus, the fixed effects approach for controlling for potential endogeity would not control for a subset of the consumer population having tastes for the unobservable characteristics, which if it were the case, would bias my parameter estimates. However, the price sensitivity parameter estimates in both specifications of the model have the proper sign and appear reasonable in magnitude, which leads me to believe that I am doing a reasonable job of dealing with this potential source of endogeneity through the fixed effects approach.
Additionally, the set of fixed effects being negative implies that consumers prefer to purchase fluid milk at stores who operate with the base channel, which is grocery, which is what one would expect ex ante.
Marginal effects with the label "GAL Char" are household demographic characteristics that have been interacted with the gallon sized container indicator variable, whereas "BFC Char" marginal effects are the same household demographic characteristics interacted with the butterfat content ≥ 2% indicator variable instead. In terms of the majority of these demographic characteristics, there is little to have strong feelings regarding their expected sign ex-ante, thus I will only highlight selected characteristics. One would anticipate that "Days Since Last Milk Purchase" would have a positive marginal effect for the gallon size interaction, as such would imply that a household's home stock of fluid milk diminishes, they would have stronger preferences for fluid milk, but I find negative marginal effects. However, the marginal effect is very small in magnitude, -0.00975, which may indicate that the home stock for a household is largely unimportant in terms of making their purchasing decisions, implying that the household's preference for fluid milk is most important.
See table 6 for the elasticities implied by the parameter estimates. These own-price elasticities are somewhat larger in magnitude than what has been found in the literature, but are quite consistent with what one would expect ex-ante as they imply that household are relatively more price sensitive for the organic products.
Comparison of Demand Parameter Estimates
In this subsection of the paper, I will compare and contrast the results of the standard model to my preferred specification to show why it is important to utilize household level data when feasible.
To begin, consider the parameter estimate for the gallon sized container dummy variable between the models. This estimate increases drastically (from a marginal effect for a preference for gallon sized containers over the smaller sizes of $0.97 to $1.33 after introducing the demographic characteristics to the model) after introducing the household demographic characteristics to the model, which presents evidence that a market level analysis that does not consider household demographics/decisions may lead to estimates that are biased towards zero.
Additionally, consider the difference between the parameter estimates of households tastes for butterfat. In the specification that does not include household demographic characteristics, we see that households prefer to have less butterfat to more by approximately $.0044
51 Whereas in the model that includes households demographic characteristics, we see that household have a preference for more butterfat rather than less and are willing to pay approximately $0.18 more for it. Again, showing evidence that ignoring the effect household demographic characteristics have on demand may lead to biased parameter estimates, of which the bias in some cases may cause the sign of the coefficient estimate to change.
Next consider the difference between the parameter estimates of households tastes for organic products. In the standard specification, I show that households prefer non-organic products to organic products and are willing to pay approximately $.32 more for the non-organic goods on average. Whereas in the model that includes household demographic characteristics, I show that households have an even stronger preference towards non-organic goods on average and are willing to pay approximately double, $0.64, for non-organic goods on average.
Both results appear troubling at first glance, though they are moreso in the case of the quasimarket level specification, as it is not possible to consider how different types of households may sort amongst the goods available within the choice set. However, in the case of preferred specification which includes household demographic characteristic interaction terms labeled "ORG Char:", I am able to piece together an explanation this seemingly counter-intuitive result. By observing the relative magnitudes of the coefficient estimates associated with the interaction terms for organic products, it appears that the main household demographic characteristics that shape household preferences towards organic goods are education 52 , income 53 and marital status. My results indicate that households that have a yearly income greater than the U.S. median and have at least one household head that has attended college develop preferences towards organic goods, whereas households where the household heads are married strongly prefer non-organic goods. At this time, I am going to be somewhat agnostic as to why this is the case, but it is important to note that I am only able to make these types of statements due to the introduction of household demographic characteristics to the model. Much of the previous literature on price discrimination either is unable to include this type of information on households due to data availability or has determined that household demographic characteristics are mostly unimportant, though my result clearly indicate otherwise.
Lastly, I will consider differences between the price parameter estimates and the channel/private label fixed effects which as discussed in the previous subsection, are included to control for product characteristics that are unobserved by the econometrician but observed by all economic agents within the model. The price parameter estimates are almost identical between the standard speci-fication and my preferred specification, a finding that was not anticipated as it is easy to think of a story where not including the household demographic characteristics may bias price sensitivity estimates. The unobserved product characteristic fixed effects (UFE) are similarly almost identical as well. This allows me to infer that the UFEs must be almost completely uncorrelated with household demographic characteristics, as strong correlation between the UFEs and household demographic characteristic would lead to endogeneity in the standard specification. Assuming that the UFEs are not endogenous in the preferred specification would imply that they are not endogenous in the standard specification. Table 7 , presents the decomposition of the marginal costs that I estimate via equation (13) and use during the counterfactual analysis. The coefficient estimates associated with the gallon sized container dummy, butterfat dummy and organic dummy are all positive and the relative magnitudes of the coefficient estimate on gallon and organic are significantly larger than the coefficient estimate associated with butterfat. This seems particularly convincing one would think that whole and 2% fluid milk products should have higher marginal costs to firms on average than skim and 1% goods as butterfat is a commodity that can be sold separate of raw milk and a market regulated by the USDA. This in combination with the fact that whole and 2% fluid milk products contain more butterfat than skim and 1% products lead me to believe that the sign associated with coefficient estimate should be positive, but much smaller than the size of the container and the good's organic status.
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Supply Results
Furthermore, private label dummy variable is negative, implying that it is cheaper for firms to produce and sell their own branded products in comparison to those sold by a regional brand. Additionally, both the raw milk cost and total number of firms in a 3-digit zip code are positive as expected.
The only somewhat odd finding in Table 7 is that some of the channel dummy variables that are included in the regression have coefficient estimates that are negative in sign, implying that these channels have lower marginal cost than the omitted case which are firms within the grocery channel. However, the magnitudes for the warehouse store and other store channels are very small and imply that firms within these channels may have lower marginal costs on average than grocery store firms, but if they do it is by a margin of approximate $0.01-$.04 per unit produced. Since the difference is so small, I see this as a case where the costs are statistically different from one another between the grocery channel and warehouse store/Other channel, but are like not meaningful in any sort of economic way.
The coefficient estimate associated with the drug store channel however is not only statistically significant, but fairly large in magnitude in comparison to the parameter estimates of the other channel types, thus clearly implying that drug stores must have lower marginal costs for producing milk than grocery stores. I found this to be odd at first, but after looking at the differences in prices between these channels this is no longer troubling, as on average, drug stores sell their products for lower prices than grocery stores.
Measure of Price Discrimination
Following Cohen (2008) , I compute unit-markups and unit-costs for each size for each trip. The unit-price discount is equal to the difference in marginal costs between the two size groupings is (MC smaller size −MC larger size ) plus the difference in markups (Markup smaller size −Markup larger size ), all of which are measured in quantities per-unit. By dividing the difference in unit-markups, by the difference in unit-prices (outlined previously), I obtain a measure of the extent to which price discrimination is determinant in unit-price differentials across sizes. I compute this measure for private label and regional brand products separately. In doing so I find that 8.02% of the markup for private label products can by explained by price discrimination, whereas only 0.34% of the markup for regional brand products can be explained by price discrimination. This implies that firms are only able to price discriminate on their own branded goods, a result consistent with Lui and Shen (2012) .
Welfare Counterfactual
One of the motivating reasons behind structural estimation techniques are the ability to perform counterfactual experiments once the parameters of the model have been estimated, this section of the paper includes these counterfactuals. Since there has yet to be a consensus within either the empirical or theoretical literature on whether or not price discrimination is welfare increasing from the consumer's perspective 55 I test to see the effect of price discrimination from the consumer's perspective via counterfactual analysis. As a brief highlight of the current literature, Leslie (2004) and Cohen (2008) found that price discrimination within their market of focus to be welfare increasing from the consumer's perspective, whereas McManus (2007) and Miller and Osborne (2014) found it to be welfare decreasing.
To test the welfare implications of this pricing strategy from the consumer's perspective, consider the following thought experiment: suppose there is a world where firms who participate within the fluid milk market are no longer allowed to utilize nonlinear pricing schedules, or that firms within this market must charge the same price per ounce for every size container they sell.
56 One approach to finding the overall affect of welfare would be to compare the current world to the fictional world outlined above in terms of total welfare. I attempt to do so by following Ben Akiva (1972), McFadden (1973) and Domencich and McFadden (1975) 's "log sum formula" for finding consumer surplus:
where the superscript "1" denotes the fictional world with linear price schedules and the superscript "0" denotes the nonlinear price schedule. Without solving for the optimal price schedule, I need to make assumptions on which linear price the firm sets in the fictional world. Since it is not immediately clear, table 9 presents welfare calculations using the linear price per ounce of the listed size for all options given the parameter estimates presented in appendix C. Since it is not immediately clear to me what prices a government agency my implement in this hypothetical world, I consider several different linear price sets, from an unconditional mean price per ounce based upon the size of the products to a mean price per ounce that is conditional on both organic status and brand type.
In each of the counterfactual analyses, the units for the welfare change in the first column are in dollars per shopping trip, which implies that under the various Gallon price based pricing regimes, each household is on average between $.107 to $.166 better off per shopping trip than under current market conditions according the the counterfactuals which utilitize household demographic information. This result is to be expected as firms use nonlinear pricing schedules that provide quantity discounts to those who purchase the gallon sized container. Contrastly, the households in my sample are on average between $0.057-$0.0669 worse off per shopping trip under a half gallon/quart pricing regime, which is again to be expected as in order to provide a quantity discount to consumers who purchase gallon sized containers, firms must charge more per ounce for the smaller sized half gallon and quart sized units.
Of these sets of counterfactuals, I find the average price for all sizes condition an scenario to be most compelling. Under the average price for all sizes, I find that households are on average between $0.0284-$.0609 better off per shopping trip. Since the results of the counterfactuals are somewhat split, being that households are better off under gallon linear prices and worse off under half gallon/quart linear prices, I find the counterfactuals that utilize a mean price per ounce between the two to be most compelling. As such, I feel comfortable concluding that households are worse off due to the nonlinear price schedules that firms within the fluid milk industry utilize in the marketplace.
The last column of table 9 presents a back-of-the-envelop estimate of the total welfare changes as a sum of the total change of all households who live in my region 57 during a year. To calculate these changes, I assume that each household takes a number of trips to stores that could sell fluid milk that is equal to the average found in the Nielsen dataset over my sample period of 2008 and 2009. I then use the total number of households that live in the region, as provided by the Census Bureau, of 18,592,941 total households and multiply the total number of households by the numbers in the per trip column and by the average number of trips per household. I find that the total potential welfare benefits for all households under a gallon linear pricing regime is between approximately $268 and $418 million per year, whereas households are between $168 million and $143 million worse off a year in aggregate under a half gallon/quart designed linear pricing schedule.
In the average of all prices counterfactuals, I compute that consumers would be between approximately $71 million to $145 million better off per year in aggregate. Note that these estimates represent an upper bound of the possible yearly welfare change, as these calculations implicitly assume that all households living in this region participate in the market for fluid milk, whereas only households who do actually participate in this market would be effected by the nonlinear pricing in this market. These estimates may seem large, but according to the USDA, approximately 109,425 million pounds 58 of fluid milk were sold nation wide during the time period, thus these dollar amounts seem fairly reasonable as these estimates would represent a small fraction of the market in terms of sales revenue, yet a large welfare change to consumers who participate in the market.
Since I have looked into the effect of including household demographic characteristics on the demand parameter estimates in detail, the next logical step is to compare the results of my counterfactual analysis under both sets of assumptions. The first in each set of the counterfactual results, indicated by the subtitle "w/HH Demographics", are from my preferred specification, which were computed using the averages of the household demographic characteristics that firm f faces in the market that they serve during each store-week period. The second entry in each set of counterfactual results, indicated as "w/o HH Demographics" in their subtitle, are computed using the parameter estimates from the standard specification and in no way depend on household level demographic information. Observing the differences in welfare levels per trip between the two specification, I show that the standard specification appears to systematically overstate the welfare loss to consumers if a linear price schedule based upon any of the current average price per ounce were introduced to the market place, those the overstatement is seemling small in per trip terms, differences in yearly aggregates are measured in millions of dollars. One potential implication from this result is that if the household level choices/demographic characteristics are ignored when estimating demand parameters, then welfare counterfactuals may be understated in terms of their magnitudes. This result may also help explain why my estimated elasticities are somewhat larger in magnitude than what has been estimated previously within the literature.
I find the counterfactual using the average price per ounce of all product sizes to yield the most compelling results of the three linear price sets as it seems like the most likely of the three that would be used by firms within the market if they were forced to use linear price schedules tomorrow. As such, and for the other reasons presented above I find that the nonlinear price schedules used by the firms within the market are welfare increasing from the consumer's perspective.
However, this methodology is clearly limited, as firms have not been given a chance to respond and reoptimize in terms of setting their linear price. Additionally, firms within the fluid milk industry may find that it is no longer profitable to sell the smaller sized containers, which is ignored by this methodology. I find the price computations with the average price per ounce of all sizes to be most compelling of the three measures as it would represent a world that firms would seem mostly likely to choose if not given the chance to reoptimize. Thus, I find that nonlinear pricing is welfare I cannot be entirely certain of the effect of mandating a linear price schedule from the consumer's perspective until these ideas are taken into account.
With all that being said, I find these calculations to be consistent with a story that nonlinear price schedules in this market are welfare decreasing, however an approach where firms are allowed to reoptimize their prices and the menu of products would provide more compelling evidence.
Conclusion
This paper attempts to find evidence of second degree price discrimination in the oligopoly market of fluid milk. Using consumer level data provided by the Nielsen Company, I find that firms are only able to price discriminate on their own private label products, of which 8.02% of the markup can be explained by price discrimination, but not the regional brand
In addition, through counterfactual analysis, I find that price discrimination is welfare increasing from the consumer's perspective whereas if firms were forced into linear price schedules households would be $0.1014 per trip per household would lead to a total welfare loss of anywhere between $71 million to $152 per year in aggregate to the sample region yearly. Additionally, by estimating a model with and without household demographic characteristics and comparing the models, I see that ignoring consumer decisions as well as the demographic make up of the market place being study leads to biased parameter estimates. Consumers who purchase the smaller sizes, quart and half gallon containers, yield some amount of utility from more convenient sized packages, whereas consumers who purchase gallon sized containers enjoy lower prices as a result of higher competition in this segment of the market. These findings are in line with what the previous literature has found and are possibly more compelling than what previous papers have done given the richness of the data that I utilize as provided by the Nielsen company. Note: These estimates were obtained from a 5% random sample of the full dataset. The columns of the table labeled "Coef w/o HH" and "SE w/o HH" are estimates from a model that does not include household demographic characteristics, whereas the columns labeled "Coef w/HH" and "SE w/HH" are estimates from a model that does include household demograpic characteristics. UFE represents fixed effects that are included to control for product characteristics that are observed by economic agents within the models but not by the econometrician. All UFE ("Channel") variables are interacted with a private label brand dummy variable. "GS$C" represents the channel that includes gas/service stations and dollar/convenience stores. Stores that could reasonably sell fluid milk, but do not fit into any of the channels are labeled as "Other." The omitted case for the UFE ("Channel") fixed effects is the Grocery/Hypermarket channel. The standard errors presented by this table are OLS standard errors. Since OLS standard errors are inappropriate, future drafts of this paper will present bootstrapped standard errors instead. Note: The abbreviation of the choices seen are characterized as follows: "Brand Type (R being regional brand and P being private label brand)"-"Package Size (HQ representing half gallon and quart sized containers and GA being gallon sized containers)"-"Butterfat Content (L referring to choices with butterfat content less than 2% and W referring to choices with butterfat content of 2% or greater)"-"Organic (N representing non-organic and O representing organic)". Note: To obtain these estimates, I aggregate to the firm-week level. Grocery is the omitted case for the channel dummy variables. Note: This table outlines how the simulated choice set was constructed. As stated in in section 4.2, only the choice that the household makes on a shopping trip is observable as data, but the entire menu of choices is necessary to estimate demand. As such, I construct the household's choice set by starting with the characteristics of the choice they chose on the trip, then use the various aggregates of data listed in the table to update information about the choice set the household faces using data from purchases made by other households on other products as well as through the Nielsen Scanner data during that week.
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This section of the appendix includes summary statistics for households in the Nielsen Panel dataset in years 2008-2009. Note: An observation is an active household year.
